I was doing some work for a customer recently that involved a lot of manipulating file system permissions and ownerships and I realized that we've not yet had a Command Line Kung Fu Episode on this subject. That's just crazy! So let's address this shortcoming right here and now.
You're probably familiar with the chown command for changing the owner (and group owner, if desired) of a file or group of files. Add the "-R" (recursive) option, and you can set the ownerships on an entire directory structure:
# chown -R hal:users /home/hal
These days you typically have to be root to use the chown command. In the olden days of Unix, it was common to allow any user to use chown and let them "give away" their own files to other users. But this caused problems for systems that used disk quotas because it was a loophole that allowed malicious users to consume other users' quotas. And in the really old days the chown command wouldn't strip execute bits when files were chowned, thus allowing you to create set-UID binaries belonging to other users-- obviously a huge security problem.
The problem with having to chown everything as root, however, is that all too often I see administrators making a mistake like this:
# cd /home/hal
# chown -R hal:users .* # *NEVER* DO THIS! DANGER!
Why is the above chown command so dangerous? The problem is that the glob ".*" matches the ".." link that points back to the parent directory of the current directory. So in the example above we're going to end up making the entire /home file system owned by "hal". This is actually incredibly difficult to recover from, short of restoring from a backup, because it's not safe to assume that every file in a user's home directory is going to be owned by that user.
Anyway, the safe way to chown a user's "dot-files" and directories is:
# chown -R hal:users .[^.]* # SAFE
The "[^.]" means "match any character EXCEPT period", thus protecting you from matching the ".." link. Of course it would also skip files and directories named things like "..example", but you wouldn't expect to find these in a typical file system.
Having set the ownerships on a set of files, you can also control the access rights or permissions on those files. There are three categories of permissions-- the permissions for the primary owner of the file ("user" permissions), the group owner of the file ("group" permissions), and "everybody else" ("other" in Unix parlance). For each group you can allow "read" access (view the contents of a file or get a listing of a directory), "write" (modify the contents of a file or add, remove, and/or rename files in a directory), and/or "execute" privileges (execute a file as a program or access files in a directory). In "absolute" mode with the chmod command, we express these permissions as a vector of octal digits: "read" is 4, "write" is 2, and "execute" is 1. Here are some common examples:
$ chmod 755 /home/hal # rwx for me, r+x for group and other
$ chmod 666 insecure # rw for everybody, "world writable"
$ chmod 700 private.dir # only I have access here
Because the default assumption for the Unix operating system is to create world-writable files and directories, we use the umask value to express which bits we want NOT to be set when new files are created. The common Unix umask default is "022" which means "don't set the write bits for group and other". Some sites enforce a default umask of "077", which requires you to explicitly use chown to all others to access your files ("discretionary access control" is the term usually bandied about here).
There's actually an optional leading fourth digit you can use with the chmod command, which covers the "set-UID" (4), "set-GID" (2), and "sticky-bit" settings (1). Here are some examples showing the typical permission settings for some common Unix programs and directories:
# chmod 4755 /bin/su # set-UID
# chmod 2755 /usr/sbin/sendmail # set-GID
# chmod 1777 /tmp # "sticky"
The "sticky-bit" is another interesting piece of Unix history. Back in the very old days when computers, disks, and even memory were vastly slower than they are today, there was a significant start-up cost with loading a program into memory before execution. For commonly-used programs like ls, the total overhead was enormous. So certain executables were marked with the "sticky-bit" as a signal to the kernel so that the program image would tend to "stick around" in memory so that the program didn't have to constantly be reloaded. Of course, in the age of shared libraries plus fast disks and memory this use has long since stopped having any value. Nowadays, the sticky bit is used as a marker on world-writable directories like /tmp and prevents anybody except the owner of the file from removing or renaming the file.
As you're probably aware, chmod also supports "symbolic" mode for expressing changes to the permissions of files:
$ chmod go-w insecure # strip the write bits for group and other
$ chmod a+x myscript # make file executable for everybody ("all")
$ chmod +x myscript # same as above
The first part of the syntax is the groups to apply the permission change to: "u" for the primary user or owner of the file, "g" for the group owner, and "o" for other or everybody else. You can also use "a" to represent all groups, or just leave it off completely because "a" is the default. The next item in the symbolic description is a plus or a minus sign depending on whether you're "adding" or "subtracting" permission bits. Finally you specify the bit(s) you want to add or subtract.
Why is symbolic mode useful? Well, I recently needed to make an entire directory structure be only accessible by its owner. You can't really use absolute file modes for this, because while "chmod -R 600 ..." would work fine for regular files, it wouldn't do for the directories (directories must have "x" set to be usable). "chmod -R 700 ..." would be fine for directories, but not appropriate for regular files. You could hack something together with find, but it's much easier to just do:
# chmod -R go-rwx /some/directory
This strips all bits for the "group" and "other" categories, but leaves the current permissions for the owner of the file alone.
Unfortunately, I now have to turn things over to Ed. I say "unfortunately", because I'm going to have to endure his gloating about the higher level of permissions granularity implemented in NTFS as compared to the typical Unix file system. To this my only response is, "Oh yeah? Tell me about ownerships and permissions in FAT file systems, boyo."
I thought we had an agreement to never bring up FAT. As far as I'm concerned, it never happened. NTFS has been with us since Day 1. Yeah... right.
Anyway, since Hal brought up FAT, I'll address it briefly. There is no concept of security with FAT file systems. Every user is God and can access everything. It's a relic from the days when DOS (and later Windows) machines were expected to be single-user systems not connected to, you know, a network or anything. The security model was to diligently implement no security model whatsoever. Mission accomplished!
But, then, there came NTFS. Ahhh... finally, a modern file system for Windows boxen. NTFS has the concept of ownership and even more fine-grained controls than our Unix brethren have. As Windows NT matured into Windows 2000 and then XP/2003, and then Vista/2008 and beyond, these fine-grained permissions and the ability to manipulate them at the command line has expanded significantly. In fact, we're now to the point where these features are simultaneously flexible enough to use yet complex enough to be overwhelming and almost unusable. That happens a lot in the Windows world.
From the command-line, we can see the ownership of a file or directory using the dir command with the /q option:
C:\> dir /q
Nice! Easy! Cool!
Yeah, but wait. Now things get ugly. If the hostname\username is particularly long, it will be truncated in the display, which allocates only 23 characters for the hostname backslash username. None of the other output formatting options of dir (/b, /w, /d, and /x) fix this, because they either override /q (leaving off the ownership info) or keep the truncation. This problem is livable, but still kind of annoying.
To change the owner of a file or directory, a la the Linux chown command, we can use the icacls command found in 2003 SP2, Vista, 2008, and Windows 7, as follows:
C:\> icacls [filename] /setowner [username]To change the owner in a recursive fashion, use the /t option with icacls, because, as everyone knows the word "recursive" has no letter t in it. That makes it easy to remember, right? (Actually, I think they were going after the mnemonic for "tree", but a /s or even a /r would be more palatable). And, /c makes icacls continue despite an error with one or more files as it is processing through a /t or wildcard.
Now, look at that list of supported Windows versions for icacls... there's an important one missing from the list. Which one? Queue the Jeopardy music and pause. Sadly, it's our good friend, Windows XP. Unfortunately, I haven't found a way at the command line using only built-in tools to change owner in XP. You could mount the XP system's drive from a 2003/Vista/2008/7 box and run icacls, but that's not exactly using built-in tools, now, is it? You can copy the 2003 SP2 version of icacls.exe to Windows XP, and it'll work... but again, that's not exactly using built-in tools, and I have no idea whether that violates some sort of Windows license limitation. And, I don't want to know, so don't send me any mail about it.
The Vista version won't run on XP though. I've also found that icacls on 2003 (whether running in 2003 or... ahem... copied to XP) is quite buggy as well, often giving errors when trying to change owners. This 2003 icacls fail is a known issue documented by Microsoft, and they released a hotfix for it which is seldom installed. So, does this count as not using a built-in command? :)
To change ownership in the GUI on XP, you can apply a ridiculous process described by Microsoft here.
Now, XP does include the cacls command (not icacls), as does Win2K and all of the later versions of Windows. The cacls command lets you change permissions, the rough equivalent of the Linux chmod command. But, cacls will not let you change the owner.
The syntax for the cacls command lets us specify the file or directory name we want to change, followed by a bunch of potential options. We can grant access rights with /G [user:perm]. The perms supported at the command line are R (Read), W (Write), C (Change, sometimes referred to as "Modify" in Windows documentation), and F (Full Control). These rights are actually conglomerations of the very fine grained rights built-into NTFS, which are described here.
We can revoke these access rights with /R [user]. Note that you cannot revoke individual rights (R/W/C/F), but instead you revoke all of them at a given time for a user. Revocation is an all-or-nothing situation. The /E is used to edit the existing ACL, as opposed to the default, which replaces the ACL. We often want to use /E so that we don't blow away any access rights already there. There is also a /D [user] option in cacls, which explicitly denies the user access to the object, again on an all or nothing basis. These deny rights override any allow rights, thankfully.
With that overview under our belts, to frame the following fu, I'd like to mimic Hal's commands, mapping them into the Windows world to the extent we can.
We start with Hal's first command:
$ chmod 755 /home/hal # rwx for me, r+x for group and otherIn Windows, we can achieve the same thing with these three commands:
C:\> cacls [filename] /G [username]:FNote that the R here is a conglomerated Read, which includes reading and executing the file (again, those conglomerated rights are defined here). Also, in the first command of these three, we've not used /E, so we are blowing away all existing access rights to start out and adding full control for our username in the first command. Hal's assigning permissions absolutely, not relative to existing permissions, so we leave off the /E. In our follow-up command, though, we edit rights (/E) building on with a couple of extra commands to match roughly what Hal has done.
C:\> cacls [filename] /E /G [groupname]:R
C:\> cacls [filename] /E /G Everyone:R
Next, our sparring buddy ran:
$ chmod 666 insecure # rw for everybody, "world writable"We can roughly mimic this with:
C:\> cacls [filename] /G [username]:F
C:\> cacls [filename] /E /G Everyone:C
Now, the execute capability is baked into both Full control (F) and Change (C), so we're not really removing execute capability here. With icacls (not cacls), we can access the fine-grained rights and make a file read-only with:
C:\> icacls [filename] /grant Everyone:RWRemember, /G is for cacls, and /grant is for icacls. Consistency is a beautiful thing.
And then, Hal pulled this out of his ear:
$ chmod 700 private.dir # only I have access hereIn our comfy Windows world, we could run:
C:\> cacls [filename] /G [username]:FWithout the /E above, this snips off everyone else's access.
Hal then wowed us all with:
$ chmod go-w insecure # strip the write bits for group and otherThis one is a bear to do at the command-line in Windows, because the /R option is all or nothing when revoking permissions. We'd need to analyze the existing ACL first, and then manipulate it with a /E to build the ACL we want. It would require a script to do this by my estimation.
Hal then popped off:
$ chmod a+x myscript # make file executable for everybody ("all")Which we can do with:
C:\> cacls [filename] /E /G Everyone:RAgain, in cacls, R includes Read and Execute.
And, finally, Hal did:
# chmod -R go-rwx /some/directoryWhich, mapped to our own personal insanity, is:
C:\> cacls [directory] /p [user]:F /tIn this one, we've used the /p to replace the existing ACLs for the given user name, which we are giving full control (F), in a recursive fashion (/t).
Be careful when playing with icacls and cacls, because they are a great way to very much hose up your system. The icacls command has an option to save ACLs into a file for later inspection or even restoring from:
C:\> icacls [file_or_dir] /save [aclfile]
Again, we have a /t or /c option here. The restore function is invoked with /restore. It should be noted that the aclfile holds only relative paths. Thus, if you are going to do a restore, you need to run the command in the same directory that you used for the icacls /save.